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et al.: Qualifications of Governor

QUALIFICATIONS OF GOVERNOR AND
LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR
N.Y. CONST. art. IV, § 2:
No person shall be eligible to the office of governor or lieutenant-governor, except a citizen of the United States, of the age
of not less than thirty years, and who shall have been five years
next preceding his election a resident of this state.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD DEPARTMENT
Galbraith v. New York Conservative Party 88 1
(decided March 22, 1990)

Plaintiff, a prospective candidate for governor, claimed that article IV, section 2 of the New York State Constitution, 882 which
establishes a residency requirement to be met before a candidate
may run for governor, violated the equal protection clause of the
United States Constitution. 883 Using a rational relation test, the
court held that the requirement that a gubernatorial candidate reside in New York for five years prior to the election, was constitutional. 884
The New York State Constitution requires a prospective New
York gubernatorial candidate to live in the state for five concurrent years immediately preceding the election. The plaintiff lived
and worked intermittently in New York since 1957. He lived in
Connecticut from 1980 through 1981, at which point he decided
to leave his home in Connecticut and move to New York. While
881. 155 A.D.2d 183, 552 N.Y.S.2d 717 (3d Dep't 1990).

882. N.Y. CONsT. art. IV, § 2.
883. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 ("All persons born or naturalized in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside.").
884. Galbraith, 155 A.D.2d at 186, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
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looking for a house, the plaintiff accepted a position as
Ambassador to France. He moved to France and lived there for
four years. In 1985, the plaintiff resigned and returned to
Connecticut. Subsequently, he sold his residence in Connecticut
and moved to New York. Upon attempting to run for governor of
New York in the 1990 election, he was deemed not to have met
885
the state constitutional residency requirement.
The court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs equal protection
claim because the objective of the statute 886 was rationally related
to the restrictions imposed. Furthermore, the appellate division
stated that the tenth amendment of the Federal Constitution empowers states to impose restrictions upon candidates running for
public office. 887
The rational relation test applied was part of a three-tier analysis articulated in Dunn v. Blumstein888 to establish "the validity
of an equal protection claim." 889 This analysis requires that the
court examine: 1) the character of the classification in question;
2) the individual interests affected by the classification; and 3) the
890
governmental interest asserted in support of the classification.
The Galbraithcourt found that the character of the classification in question was the type to be analyzed under a rational relation standard, as opposed to the type of classification to be analyzed under strict scrutiny. 89 1 This is because the court found
that candidates running for public office are not a suspect class,
and the right to run for office, although indirectly linked to the
right to vote, was not a fundamental right. 892 Therefore, the
individual interest affected, i.e., the right to run for office, did
not deserve heightened scrutiny. Finally, the court found that the
885. Id. at 185, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
886. The state has an "interest of reciprocal familiarity of a candidate with
State-wide interests and the people with the candidate. . . ." Id. at 186, 552
N.Y.S.2d at 719.
887. Id.
888. 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972).
889. Galbraith, 155 A.D.2d at 185, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 719.

890. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 335.
891. Galbraith, 155 A.D.2d at 186, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 719.

892. Id. at 184-85, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 719.
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quality of the state interest that the statute promoted was
rationally related to the state's objective, which was to ensure
that those running for office would be acquainted with the
peculiarities of the New York system, its strengths and
weaknesses, and the local needs of the state. Thus, the court held
that the state's interests with reciprocal familiarity of a candidate
with the people, and the people with a candidate, results in only
minimal infringement on any right to participate in the process
and does not violate the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution. 893
The United States District Court for the District of New
Hampshire squarely addressed the issue of durational residency
requirements imposed upon candidates running for public office
on two separate occasions. 894 As in Galbraith, the New
Hampshire district court began its analysis by referring to the
Dunn v. Blumstein895 test for determining whether a law violates
the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution.
Interestingly, however, the New Hampshire district court, unlike
the New York Court of Appeals, analyzed the residency
requirement under a strict scrutiny analysis on both occasions.
This was done despite the fact that the class of candidates running
for public office is not suspect, nor has the Supreme Court
characterized the right to run for office as a fundamental right. 896
In Chimento v. Stark, the New Hampshire district court stated
that "[w]here, as here, the law in question poses a barrier to a
candidacy of a not insubstantial segment of the community and,
to that degree, limits the voters in their choice of candidates, we
' 897
hold that the stricter standard of review should be applied."
893. Id. at 186, 552 N.Y.S.2d at 719-20.
894. See Sununu v. Stark, 383 F. Supp. 1287 (D.N.H. 1974), aff'd, 420
U.S. 958 (1975); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.), aff'd, 414
U.S. 802 (1973).
895. 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
896. See Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
897. Chimento, 353 F. Supp. at 1214. The decision to apply a stricter
standard of scrutiny also stemmed from precedent which tends to color state
restrictions upon candidacy as somewhat impinging on the right to vote. Id. at
1214; see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968) ("the right of

individuals to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right
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Despite the heightened scrutiny, the court in both cases held that
the residency requirements imposed did not violate the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution. In Chimento,
the court accepted the state's assertion that its justification in
imposing a residency requirement on the right to run for
governor is twofold. 898 First, the residency requirement would
ensure familiarity with the local government. The governor
should be the one who is aware of particular needs and problems
within the state. Further, it would give the voters "an
opportunity to gain by observation and personal contact some
firsthand knowledge of the candidates for Governor.- 899 Second,
the requirement would "prevent frivolous candidacy by persons
who have had little previous exposure to the problems and desires
of the people of. . . [the state]." 90 0 Lastly, the Chimento court
rejected the plaintiff's equal protection argument because the
residency requirement did not exclude anyone from running for
the office of governor; it only postponed the opportunity.
Therefore, there was no complete barrier imposed on the opportunity to run for office.
In Sununu v. Stark,90 1 the New Hampshire district court simply
cited to Chimento's reasoning as to why strict scrutiny was applied. 90 2 The court listed three principal state interests in a resiof qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to cast their votes
effectively") (quoting Chimento, 353 F. Supp. at 1214); see also Bullock v.
Carter, 405 U.S. at 143 ("the rights of voters and the rights of candidates do
not lend themselves to neat separation; laws that affect candidates always have

at least some theoretical, correlative effect on voters.").
However, the Chimento court also noted that the barrier to participate in the

race for candidacy affected a "not insubstantial segment of the community."
Chimento, 353 F. Supp. at 1214. The court cited to a statistical analysis

presented by the plaintiff "of the number of people who have not lived in New
Hampshire for seven years." Id. at 1214 n.6.
898. Chimento, 353 F. Supp. at 1215. The court began its discussion by
stating, "[a] state's right to impose restrictions on one seeking public office is
a power reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution." Id.
899. Id.
900. Id.
901. 383 F. Supp. 1287 (1974), af'd, 420 U.S. 958 (1975).
902. Id. at 1290.
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dency requirement for a state senatorial position. First,
familiarity with needs of the state government; second, exposure
to the voters; and third, to "prevent political carpetbagging." 903
Finally, the court noted that if this constitutional provision is to
be changed, it should be done through the ballot, not through the
judiciary. 904
The New York Court of Appeals' decision to apply rational
basis scrutiny in determining the constitutionality of a state constitutional residency requirement imposed upon candidates running for public office, subsequent to two United States district
court decisions that applied heightened scrutiny in analyzing
similar requirements appearing in another state constitution, may
stem from the inconsistent language appearing in the seminal
United States Supreme Court case of Bullock v. Carter.905
In Bullock, the Court first addressed the issue of state imposed
restrictions on candidates for public office. 906 The Court decided
that the restriction would be "closely scrutinized" 907 although
the Court had not previously "attached such fundamental status to
candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.", 90 8 This
was because the exclusionary effect of the filing fee affected voters' rights in a way that was "neither incidental nor remote." 909
However, it is clear that the Supreme Court did not apply strict
scrutiny in analyzing the Texas statute despite its call for close
scrutinization. 9 10 For example, the court wrote, "that the laws
must be 'closely scrutinized' and found reasonably necessary to
the accomplishment of legitimate state objectives in order to pass
constitutional muster." 9 11 The Court proceeded to reject the
state's claim that the statute be scrutinized under a rational rela903. Id.
904. Id. at 1291.
905. 405 U.S. 134 (1972).
906. Id. at 141. A Texas statute imposed a filing fee upon those persons
who wished to have their name(s) placed on the ballot in a primary election.
Id. at 135.
907. Id. at 144.
908. Id. at 142-43.
909. Id. at 143-44.
910. Id. at 144.
911. Id. (emphasis added).
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tion standard, 9 1 2 and wrote that, "under the standard of review
we consider applicable to this case, there must be a showing of
necessity."'9 13 The Court did not use the words traditionally
associated with strict scrutiny analysis, that is, "compelling state
interest" or "narrowly tailored" objectives. Therefore, Supreme
Court commitment to a particular form of scrutiny when analyzing a state constitutional restriction upon candidates running for
public office is not entirely clear.
Despite the different standards of review applied in the New
York Court of Appeals and the federal courts, all have concluded
that such residency requirements do not violate the equal protection clause of the United States Constitution and, at a minimum,
survive an analysis under the rational relation standard.

912. Id.
913. Id. at 147 (emphasis added).
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